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Abstract—Critical Infrastructures (CIs), such as smart power
grids, transport systems, and financial infrastructures, are more
and more vulnerable to cyber threats, due to the adoption
of commodity computing facilities. Despite the use of several
monitoring tools, recent attacks have proven that current de-
fensive mechanisms for CIs are not effective enough against
most advanced threats. In this paper we explore the idea
of a framework leveraging multiple data sources to improve
protection capabilities of CIs. Challenges and opportunities are
discussed along three main research directions: i) use of distinct
and heterogeneous data sources, ii) monitoring with adaptive
granularity, and iii) attack modeling and runtime combination
of multiple data analysis techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past years attackers’ community has developed
smarter worms and rootkits to achieve a variety of objectives,
which range from credentials compromise to sabotage of
physical devices. Cyber threats are targeting extremely diverse
critical application domains including e-commerce systems,
corporate networks, datacenter facilities and industrial sys-
tems. For example, on July 2010, the well known Stuxnet [1]
cyber attack was launched to damage gas centrifuges located
at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant in Iran by modifying their
speed very quickly and sharply. On August 2012, the Saudi
oil giant Aramco was subjected to a large cyber attack1 that
affected about 30000 workstations. On April 2012, the big
payment processing provider Global Payments confirmed a
massive breach2 that compromised about 1.5 million cards. On
January 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy underwent an
intrusion3 to 14 of its servers and many workstations located at
the Department’s headquarters, aimed at exfiltrating personal
information about its employees.
Analysis of data collected under real workload conditions
plays a key role to monitor system activities and to detect
ongoing anomalies. CIs are currently equipped with a variety
of monitoring tools, such as system and application logs,
intrusion detection systems (IDS), and network monitors. How-
ever, recent cyber attacks have proven that today’s defensive
mechanisms are not effective against most advanced threats.
1http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=13493
2http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=12680
3http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=14353
For example, Stuxnet was able to fool the supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) system by altering the reading
of sensors deployed on the centrifuge engines, and it went
undetected for months.
Among the possible countermeasures that could be adopted,
the idea of leveraging distinct and heterogeneous data sources
can help to draw a clearer picture of the system to protect.
Indeed, by correlating diverse information flows coming from
multiple origins not always collected by current CI monitors,
it can be possible to extract additional insights on potentially
threatening activities that are being carried out. For instance,
the presence of Stuxnet could possibly have been detected
by monitoring several other operational and environmental
parameters, like the centrifuge energy consumption, and by
correlating their readings to infer possible anomalies in the
status [2] (e.g., fluctuating power consumption in a centrifuge,
correlated with a stable rotational speed can be considered as
an anomalous state). In addition, according to a CyberArk’s re-
port [3], several successful attacks including the ones reported
above exploited privileged accounts to achieve their objectives,
and the same report states that “86% of large enterprises
(across North America and EMEA) either do not know, or
have grossly underestimated the magnitude of their privileged
account security problem”. A possible solution could consist
in leveraging the monitoring of the activities of such privileged
accounts to pinpoint ongoing suspicious activity.
The use of multiple and diverse sources producing huge
amounts of data calls for the research of new solutions
for monitoring and analysis, able to timely and efficiently
recognize ongoing malicious activities in CIs. This paper
introduces the basic notions of a framework for data-driven
security monitoring and protection of CIs. Our proposal stems
from needs and challenges for effective security monitoring
and describes an architectural solution to them, moving along
the following research directions: i) the use of large amount of
data collected from distinct and heterogeneous data sources; ii)
the adoption of monitoring strategies with an adaptable level
of granularity, to face the issue of big data volumes; iii) the
formalization of attack models and the combination of diverse
state-of-art data analysis techniques to improve the capability
of detecting threats and triggering protection actions.
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II. NEEDS AND CHALLENGES
A. Multiple Data Sources
The idea of using distinct and heterogeneous data sources
available in today’s CIs can help to draw a clearer picture of
the system to protect and of the threatening activities being
carried out. The aim is to improve the protection of future CIs
exploiting the (hidden) value of data: they are already available
but not fully exploited in today CIs.
However, as the size and complexity of systems increase,
the amount of information that can be collected by data
sources skyrockets. For example, in the 1300-nodes data center
we target as case study (see Section III-D) the monitoring
system produces about 16.6 GB of data per day, with observed
traffic peaks of about 240000 pkt/s. This is a consequence of
multiple factors: (i) the increasing availability of cheap HW
probes, (ii) the ubiquitousness of communication infrastruc-
tures (either wired or wireless) and the Internet, and (iii) the
novel algorithmic approaches that todays make handling huge
amounts of data practical. A further important aspect is that
the heterogeneity of collected data is going to increase as
well: new data sources are connected to monitoring systems
to collect and analyze different kinds of data as this could
potentially provide useful insights on current system statuses.
This mix of factors marks the shift from a mostly human-
controlled distributed monitoring model (think, for example,
about how railway companies in the past controlled the status
of their infrastructures through hundreds of people deployed
on the territory along their tracks to locally monitor and then
report to their bosses) to fully automated IT infrastructure
for monitoring that tries to relieve as much as possible from
humans the burden of analyzing data to infer high-level
information. Making this new model practical in scenarios
where huge amounts of heterogeneous data are available calls
for the research of new algorithmic and architectural solutions
able to withstand these new challenges.
B. Monitoring with different granularity
An accurate tuning of the amount of variables to be moni-
tored and the frequency of data collected from system probes
appears fundamental to study and plan at design time the
computational load on the monitoring infrastructure.
First, it is necessary to select what sources are worth
monitoring amongst the many available, considering the target
system and also the expected workload. For example in [4]
sources at the OS level, such as amount of free memory,
disk throughput, or network throughput, are selected out of
hundreds of possible indicators; their relevance for anomaly
detection is further explored and confirmed in [5].
Appropriate selection of data sources is relevant but un-
fortunately may not be sufficient. In large-scale critical infras-
tructures, given the number of components, we can reasonably
consider that monitoring each parameter using the best possi-
ble resolution system is unfeasible. Thus it may be required to
define monitoring strategies that minimize the amount of data
to analyze and consequently the monitoring resources to be
used, still without decreasing the efficacy of the monitor, e.g.,
adopting different monitoring granularities depending on the
current alert level of the system and of its components. This
calls for the definition of new solutions able to find the right
compromise in terms of the monitoring grain without having a
negative impact on the monitoring accuracy as well as without
depleting the resources devoted to monitoring.
C. On-Line Big Data Processing
The large number of collected data also implies difficulties
in the data processing phase. Several techniques and tools
have been proposed to analyze raw data with the objective of
detecting on-going attacks. However, the performance of the
detection, in terms of coverage and false alarm rate, strictly
depends on the adopted technique. Solutions which encompass
the (on-line) combination of multiple analysis techniques need
to be investigated, in order to improve the capability of
detecting potential threats and triggering protection actions
on the CI. Recent studies have also proven the usefulness
of (temporal and/or typed) graph-based attack models [6]–
[12]. If we assume that the input log is a sequence of events
having a type and a timestamp, a graph-based attack model
has event types as vertices and is defined in such a way that
the paths from start to terminal vertices in the model represent
a critical event/attack when they correspond to subsequences
of the log. Such subsequences are also called instances of the
attack model. However, finding correlations among data by
comparing analyzed data with attack models and producing
alerts in an on-line fashion may become extremely difficult
when the number of attack models at hand and the size of
the input log increase. It is therefore important to ensure the
scalability of the algorithms and data structures used when
performing the conformance checking task.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR DATA-DRIVEN SECURITY OF CIS
Figure 1 proposes an architectural solution to the discussed
challenges. The key idea is to combine several data sources
and different data analysis techniques to improve the capability
of detecting potential threats and triggering protection actions
on the CI. The results of the analysis are also useful to assess
the current alert level of the CI’s components and to adapt the
grain of monitoring through the Monitoring Adapter, e.g., to
intensify the monitoring of components deemed of suspicious
activity and reduce the monitoring of the other ones. The main
blocks of the framework are described in the following.
A. Raw Data Collection
As the name suggests, the Raw Data Collection block is
responsible for gathering raw data from the monitored CIs,
exploiting available data monitoring technologies and/or logs
produced by diverse software layers or hardware controllers.
Many technologies for data monitoring have been developed
over the past thirty years, ranging from relatively simple data
collection tools (such as Unix syslog4) to more sophisticated
data analysis systems.
4http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3164.txt
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Fig. 1: The Framework for Data-Driven Security Monitoring and
Protection of CIs
Ganglia5 is a scalable distributed monitoring system. Its hi-
erarchical design is primarily targeted at federation of clusters
and grid computing systems. Each monitored node multicasts
its monitored metrics to all nodes in its cluster, enabling
automatic discovery of nodes. Nagios6 is one of the most
used open source monitoring systems. It offers an advanced
notification system and is extensible through plug-ins. Its
functioning is based on both active and passive checks of
services, hosts and network state. Splunk7 is a commercial
monitoring system that allows search, filtering and analysis
of structured and unstructured textual logs through indexing.
Artemis [13] is a monitoring system primarily designed for
analyzing large-scale distributed logs. It has a modular design,
separating data collection from data analysis. The log collec-
tion module supports heterogeneous data sources and types
(e.g. text, binary, XML). Collection and analysis modules are
extensible through plugins and application-specific functions.
Chukwa8 is a MapReduce-based log collection and monitoring
system. It uses the Hadoop distributed file system (HDFS)
as a store and analyzes collected logs through MapReduce
jobs. It is designed to collect data from hundreds of sources
reducing the number of required HDFS files. Logbus9 is a
framework for the collection and analysis of rule-based logs,
i.e., logs produced according to formal rules in the source code
and designed to improve the detection of runtime problems in
terms of detection rate and false alarms [14].
Data collectable through these monitoring systems can be
classified in three broad categories: performance, environment,
and operational data. Performance data are among the most
monitored, and are related to the use of system resources. Main
examples are the usage of CPU or memory. Other sources are
about the use of the network, such as inbound and outbound
5http://ganglia.sourceforge.net/
6http://www.nagios.org/
7http://www.splunk.com/
8https://chukwa.apache.org/
9http://www.critiware.com/logbus.html
traffic. Environment data are rarely exploited, even if they
could be very useful to detect ongoing cyber physical attacks.
They describe the status of the environment in which the sys-
tem is placed and nodes’ parameters not related to performed
activities. In this category fall temperature, humidity, the status
of cooling systems, if any, etc. The monitoring of the energy
consumption is also in this category. Finally, Operational
data encompass all the information achieved by collecting,
and presumably parsing and filtering, logs from the various
software layers of the system, including event logs produced
by applications, the OS and IDSes, if present.
B. Adaptive Monitoring
As shown in Figure 1, the main idea is to adapt the
monitoring by dynamically changing what raw data to collect
and analyze, thus shaping at run time the resource utilization
of the monitoring framework.
All the monitoring systems described in the previous Sec-
tion III-A have been designed so as to allow users to plug-in
custom modules, in order to extend their functionalities such
to fit application-specific needs. The plug-in modules can be
implemented so as to receive external commands that dynami-
cally adapt their monitoring capabilities. An initial proposal to
reduce the complexity (i.e. the quantity of collected data, hence
required storage space and processing resources) is to define
two different monitoring layers. By default, the monitoring
system operates in a coarse-grained layer collecting a limited
number of variables, causing a high False Alarm Rate, but
also a low Missed Detection Rate. In this configuration, the
system acts as a very suspicious monitor which observes a
reduced set of indicators and that easily raises alarms. When
the coarse-grained layer detects an alarm in a specific area
of the system, it triggers a fine-grained layer for monitoring
that specific area through an enlarged set of indicators, a finer
granularity of data, possibly reducing the False Alarm Rate.
The two-layers approach may lead to two different design
solutions to be explored:
• The monitoring infrastructure is created with sufficient
spare resources that are used to activate the fine-grained
layer (we call this overprovisioning approach).
• The monitored system is created such that it does not
have spare resources, or with a very limited number of
spare resource. The activation of the fine-grained layer
in a certain area of the critical infrastructure requires to
reduce the monitoring activity in some other areas (we
call this the downgrade approach).
The first approach leads to unused resources and the number
of possible concurrent activations of the fine-grained layers is
limited by the amount of spare resources. The second approach
has no spare resources, but the downgrade of the monitoring
activity risks to expose the system, leading to a not sufficient
level of protection and/or to an unacceptable rate of False
Alarm Rate. Also, the two approaches could be merged trying
to take advantage of both of them.
Clearly, the selection of the right approach and its tuning
require to understand the distribution and temporal persistence
of anomalies in the system. This is relevant to understand the
expected frequency of fine-grained layer activations, and the
extent to which it is possible to reduce the monitoring resolu-
tion without significantly affecting the detection of threats.
On the other side of the spectrum, general purpose data
analysis systems, which include a large family of tools like
rule engines (e.g. Drools10), map reduce frameworks (e.g.
Hadoop11) and complex event processing systems (e.g. Es-
per12 and Storm13) can be integrated with data gathering and
diffusion platforms (e.g. multicast and publish/subscribe mid-
dleware) to create ad-hoc monitoring solutions. Nevertheless,
the flexibility of this approach comes at a cost: most of these
solutions must be designed and developed from scratch since
often strictly tied to their initial target environment.
A possible solution we foresee for the Monitoring Adapter
block is represented by an hybrid approach, where existing
monitoring systems and general purpose data analysis tools
are mixed and deployed in such a way to maximize their effec-
tiveness in reaching the desired adaptability goals. Monitoring
systems could locally analyze and observe specific subsystems
to provide more high level information to data analysis tools
for correlation with information provided by other different
sources. The complexity involved in mixing these approaches
together, however, remains to be studied.
C. Data Analysis
This component analyzes the data and provides as outputs
information about (i) how to adapt the grain of the monitoring,
(ii) what protection actions should be performed on the CI.
Starting from our past experiences on attack modeling and
data analysis, we consider the following functional blocks.
Data Processing. Collected raw data typically contain use-
less or redundant information that can undermine the goodness
of performed analysis [15]. The first analysis step to be
performed is thus to polish raw data, adopting filtering or event
coalescence techniques, such as the ones analyzed in [16].
Attack Modeling. This functional block provides tools to
define and statically analyze attack models. The attack model
used in this block must be capable of: (i) providing a high
degree of flexibility in representing many different security
scenarios in a compact way; (ii) allowing the specification
of various kinds of constraints (e.g., temporal) on possible at-
tacks; (iii) representing attack scenarios at different abstraction
levels, allowing to “focus” the conformance checking task in
various ways. Typed temporal graph-based attack models [9]
appear to be good options for the above requirements. They
are rich in terms of temporal constraints that can be expressed.
In addition, it is relatively easy to handle the definition of
generalization/specialization hierarchies among event types.
By way of temporal graph-based model example, consider
the hypergraph shown in Fig. 2. Here it is assumed that the
log is a sequence of tuples that represent high-level actions
10http://www.jboss.org/drools/
11http://hadoop.apache.org/
12http://esper.codehaus.org/
13http://storm.incubator.apache.org/
Fig. 2: Example graph-based attack model
corresponding to types of possible security exploits – such logs
can be built on-line from operational data. Actions are depicted
with plain circles (vi), while (hyper-)edges are depicted with
dotted circles (hi). As an instance, according to the semantics
given in [9], h1 is a start hyperedge (indicated with a white
arrow) so an attack can begin with it. The vertex labeled Local
Access requires the presence of a group of log tuples with one
ore more tuples of type Local Access (cardinality constraint
“+”); the same applies to the Directory Traversal vertex. The
hyperedge itself represents an association between the two
vertices, with a temporal constraint of (3, 10) time points for
the log segment. Hyperedge h3 requires, in any order: (i)
one or more Directory Traversal tuples; (ii) between 2 and 5
SQL Injection tuples; (iii) one or more Buffer Overflow tuples.
The same applies to other hyperedges, such as h4 and h7. In
particular, since h7 is a terminal hyperedge (indicated with a
black arrow), an attack can end with it.
Conformance Checking. The main purpose of this func-
tional block is that of detecting attack instances in sequences of
logged events by checking the conformance of logged behavior
with the given set of attack models. The main requirement
of this block is obviously scalability. In real-world critical
infrastructure protection scenarios, in fact, logged events are
streamed into the system on-line and, ideally, we would like
to raise an alert as soon as an event with a “criticality”
above the threshold is logged. It is therefore important to
define appropriate data structures that ensure fast access to
the relevant information, as well as suitable algorithms that
are tightly coupled with such structures in order to ensure the
fast detection of an attack [6], [10]. Moreover, it is important
to identify conditions that make the problem tractable from a
theoretical point of view. One possibility is that of imposing
specific limitations to the structure of the allowed models.
In fact, recent work on the detection instances of temporal
automaton-like models in sequences of logged events [7],
[8], [10] has shown that acceptable detection times in real-
world cases can be obtained by limiting the number of
partial solutions through a form of early filtering based on
temporal constraints. Finally, the parallelization of both the
data structures and the conformance checking algorithms (see,
e.g., [11]) appears mandatory when we target big data for
security protection.
Scuola Politecnica e delle Scienze di Base
Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Ingegneria Informatica Mining Invariant Relationships for Failure Analysis of Batch Software Systems
Figure 5.8: Invariant relationship between Memory and CPU percentage flow in-
tensities, with a R2 value of 0.99
the memory usage and the CPU usage, as shown also in Figure 5.8. The trends of
the two time series are very similar, but the order of magnitude di erence is 108 .
5.2.2.2 Detected Violations
The detection capabilities of the identified invariants have been tested, as in Section
5.1.2.2, on a portion of available logs di erent from the one used for the mining
phase, in order to evaluate the number of broken invariants.
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Fig. 3: Invariant relationship between Memory and CPU percentage
in a supercomputer.
Invariant-based Mining. Invariants are properties of a
system that are guaranteed to hold for all of its executions.
If those properties are found to be violated (or broken)
while monitoring the execution of the system, it is possible
to trigger alarms useful to undertake immediate protection
actions. As an example, figure 3 shows a relationship between
the memory and CPU usage discovered from workload traces
of the data ce ter discussed in Section III-D. Several studies
have confirmed that is possible to discover invariants from
real-world complex systems [17], [18]. However, in our case
the challenge is to discover invariant relationships in the
big data collected from the CI. The Invariant-based Mining
block intends to face this issue, performing two tasks: i)
to automatically mine invariants from collected data streams
using autoregressive models, and ii) to detect at runtime
when invariant relationships are broken, to trigger immediate
action. A preliminary application of the approach on real data
collected fr m a production cloud softwar system has proven
its feasibility and usefulness to discover execution deviations
and SLA violations [19].
Bayesian Inference. Security monitor usually produce a
large number of false alerts. A Bayesian network approach
can be used on the top of the CI to correlate alerts coming
from different sources and to filter out false notifications.
This approach has been successfully used to detect creden-
tial stealing attacks [20]. Raw alerts generated during the
progression of an attack, such as user-profile violations and
IDS notifications, are correlated trough a Bayesian network
to pinpoint misuse performed by compromised users. The
approach was able to remove around 80% of false positives
(i.e., not compromised user being declared compromised)
without missing any compromised user.
Fuzzy Logic. Statistical methods cause a lot of false alarms.
This is due to the difficulty in defining exact and crisp r les
describing when an event is an anomaly or not. Boundaries
between the normal and the anomaly behavior of a system
are not clear and deciding the degree of intrusion at which
an alarm is to be raised may vary in different situations
[21]. Fuzzy logic is derived from fuzzy set theory to deal
with approximate reasoning rather than precise data, and
efficiently helps to smooth the abrupt separation of normality
and abnormality [22]. Anomalous events can be described by
means of linguistic variables characterized by linguistic terms
ani. The degree of truth of an expression is not crisp (i.e. of the
type “eventj is anomaly ai” or “eventj is not anomaly ai”),
and the use of fuzzy linguistic variables allows one to express
vagueness in measurements. In some applications, 99.95% for
attack detection accuracy has been reached [21].
D. Case Studies
In the framework of the Research Project of National
Interest (PRIN) “TENACE - Protecting National Critical In-
frastructures from Cyber Threats”, we plan to experiment the
framework on data extracted from two real-world systems.
The first is the data center of the Italian Ministry of
Economic and Finance (MEF), which represents an important
CI because it manages a wide range of software, spanning
from very large applications with millions of end-users, such
as those for the consu er credit support, up to small and
very mission critical applications, such as those for managing
the auctions of Italian Government Bonds and Treasury bills,
and those for m nitoring the government securities market
(MTS). In its architecture each rack is organized in up to
five sub- acks. Each sub-rack can include up to sixteen blade
servers and is connected to the datacenter network through
four switches. A probe is connected to each switch in or-
der to monitor flowing network traffic. Two smart PDUs
are connected to each sub-rack to gather i form tio about
energy consumption. This configuration allows to enforce non-
intrusive monitoring and to consider the system as a blackbox.
The second is the S.Co.P.E. supercomputer, a scientific data
center at the University of Naples Federico II and Italian
Institute of Nuclear Physics (INFN). It is equipped with a
monitoring system that collects data similar - for type and
amount - to those collected by data centers of real CIs.
S.Co.P.E. mainly runs scientific batch jobs and also acts as
a Tier-2 r source of the Worldwi LHC Computing Grid
(WLCG)14. It is composed of 512 servers, each equipped with
2 quad core CPUs and 32 GB of memory. For jobs queueing
and scheduling and resource management, S.Co.P.E. uses
Maui/TORQUE. The monitoring system collects performance
and environment data (adopting Ganglia extended with created
additional scripts), and logs, producing about 0.7 GB of data
per day. Logs from Torque Resource Manager are used for
collecting jobs’ related data. Logs from the operating systems
can be used for collecting anomaly related data.
IV. CLOSING REMARKS AND OPEN ISSUES
Field data represent a rich source of information for improv-
ing the security monitoring and protection of future critical
infrastructures. Existing monitoring technologies already offer
the possibility of collecting different types of data, such as
performance, environmental and operational data. The idea of
collecting these types of heterogenous data, and analyze them
trough a combination os state-of-art attack modeling and data
14The Large Hadron Collider computing grid, http://wlcg.web.cern.ch
analysis techniques, is promising to improve the accuracy of
detection and drive the adaptation of the monitoring itself. In
addition, the availability of existing analysis approaches and
open, configurable monitoring tools represents a good start for
the viability of the proposed framework.
However, the achievement of envisioned research objectives
requires to face many open issues, such as:
• lack of publicly available data sets and ground truth. Such
data sets are vital for the validation of approaches like the
one proposed in this paper. Some datasets are outdated
(such as DARPA15) or unlabeled (such as, iCTF16), while
others target standard IT systems (such as UNB iSCX17).
To date, there are no datasets available for CIs.
• difficulty of performing long-running tests on real-world
systems (or representative reproductions). These tests are
very useful to improve the understanding of phenomena
and to produce realistic datasets. However, honeypot-like
approaches cannot be adopted in the case of CIs, due
to the possibility of physical damages as a consequence
of an attack. Innovative controlled environments are to
be created, involving the expertise and equipment of CIs
stakeholders.
• need of strategies for changing the monitoring configu-
ration at runtime on the basis of some predefined logic,
without being forced to stop and restart the services in
charge of gathering and analyzing data. This is impor-
tant because it provides large freedom in adapting the
monitoring without interrupting related services.
• urgency of scalable solutions to combine the outputs
generated by the different data analysis techniques, as
the ones envisaged in the framework. Further research is
in order, involving the different views and know-how of
the researchers active in these fields.
Hence, the path towards industry-ready solutions calls for
further joint industry-academia efforts, involving major players
and stakeholders, to take real advantage of big data for the
security monitoring of future critical infrastructures.
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